Contagious stress and children redux

Sandy G at The Mouse Trap reviews my earlier post on how parents’ stress can affect their children in a posting entitled Stress contagion: from parents to the child? It’s a thoughtful response — thanks, Sandy G. And there’s lots more interesting stuff at The Mouse Trap to check out for our readers. I especially enjoyed a rambling, but incredibly engaging piece, Catch 22: Psychosis, Culture and the Mind Wars; it’s a great read with so many fruitful tangential thoughts that I may have to come back and post on it again.

Sandy G. does a nice job of summarizing the four channels I suggest might be operative in transmitting stress effects to children from their parents. I think he unfairly dismisses the ‘other communication channels’ (#3); there’s some evidence, including even cross-species effects, that there are ways we affect each other’s emotional states that are not imitation and ‘chameleon’ effects. I give the example of pheromones, but that’s not the only way that this could happen. But, fair enough, Sandy doesn’t think it’s plausible, I do. The evidence is hardly conclusive so this kind of disagreement is exactly the sort of thing we need to inspire new research (‘SandyG laughed at my theories… wahahahaha, this will show him!’).

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Two languages, one brain and theory of mind

Blogging on Peer-Reviewed ResearchAt first, when I read this journal article in Social, Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, I thought, ‘Stop the presses; this one’s a barn burner.’ Since then, I’ve backed off my enthusiasm a bit, but I still think it’s fascinating. Chiyoko Kobayashi, Gary H. Glover, and Elise Tem have a really intriguing piece on brain-imaging studies done on bilingual Japanese-English speakers, when the subjects worked on false belief questions that tested their ability to solve ‘theory of mind’ problems. The piece, entitled ‘Switching language switches mind: linguistic effects on developmental neural bases of “Theory of Mind”‘ (abstract available here), comes to a number of conclusions, some of them needing to be confirmed by other research, but they’re worth mulling over at Neuroanthropology.

I discussed “false belief” (FB) tests and how they indicate developmental changes in children’s ability to perceive the thoughts of others in my post, Sapir-Whorf hypothesis is right… sort of? Kobayashi and colleagues asked bilingual subjects to solve FB problems in either Japanese or English, and they compared both younger and older subjects, who had learned their second language later in life than the younger subjects.

Different theorists disagree about how important language is to the development of ‘Theory of Mind’ (ToM) ability, affecting how children solve (or fail to solve) FB problems. For this reason, different experiments have sought to distinguish whether language ability supports the development of ToM or vice versa, but, as Kobayashi and colleagues summarize, ‘the evidence is mixed on this issue’ (62). Children improve on FB tests when given language training and yet pre-verbal children seem to be able to solve some ToM problems that are not based on language. I feel that the authors’ conclusion is warranted, that the evidence seems ‘to support a conjecture that some aspects of language affect ToM throughout development and adults may process ToM more verbally than children’ (63).

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